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Abstract 
 
The large underpricing in the Chinese IPO market has attracted much research attention. Despite 
many studies on the Chinese IPO underpricing, however, answers concerning the explanation of 
the underpricing in light of the classical IPO underpricing models, such as asymmetric 
information models, institutional explanations, and ownership and control, remain elusive. We 
attempt to shed light on this issue by examining some classical models of IPO underpricing for 
the Chinese market, especially some hypotheses not examined before. Using data from 
November 1995 to December 1998, our results show that the winner’s curse hypothesis is the 
main reason for the high IPO underpricing in China. The signaling hypothesis and manager’s 
strategic underpricing model do not stand in the Chinese market during the sample period. 
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1 Introduction 
       Much evidence suggests that initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stocks are 
systematically priced at a discount to their subsequent trading price. The large underpricing 
magnitude in the Chinese IPO market has attracted much attention. Mok and Hui (1998) report 
an underpricing of 289% for a sample of 87 Shanghai IPOs listed from 1990 to 1993.1 Su and 
Fleisher (1999) find the underpricing level as high as 948.6% for A-share IPOs before January 1, 
1996. A more updated report by Tian (2003) finds an average initial return of 267% for the IPOs 
from 1991 through 2000. These reported underpricing levels in the Chinese market are much 
higher than the average level of 60% in the emerging markets (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). 
Despite many studies on the Chinese IPO underpricing, few studies have been done to 
investigate the reasons in light of classical IPO underpricing theories. Although previous studies 
such as Mok and Hui (1998), Su and Fleisher (1999), and Chau et al. (1999) have explored some 
reasons for the high IPO underpricing, most of the studies examine specific aspects that may 
affect IPO underpricing. For many markets, whether developed or emerging, IPO underpricing 
may be explained in terms of some classical IPO underpricing models such as asymmetric 
information models, institutional explanations, and ownership and control (see Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist, 2001). Tests of the Chinese IPO underpricing against classical IPO underpricing 
models are, however, far from comprehensive. This paper attempts to shed some light on this 
and examine the classical models of IPO underpricing for the Chinese market using data from 
November 1995 to December 1998. 
       The classical IPO underpricing models examined in this study are the winner’s curse model 
(Rock, 1986), ex ante uncertainty hypothesis (Ritter, 1984; Beatty and Ritter, 1986), signaling 
model (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989, 1996) and 
                                                 
1 Underpricing is defined as the pricing of an IPO at less than its market value. A possible measure of the degree of 
underpricing is  (MV − P0)/MV, where P0 is the offer price and MV is the firm’s per-share market value on the 
offering date. Since MV is unknown on the offering date, many researchers use the initial return, (P1 − P0)/P0, where 
P1 is the first-day closing price, as a measure of underpricing. We shall adopt this terminology in this paper.  
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manager’s strategic underpricing explanation (Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack, 2001). Among 
these models, the winner’s curse model and the strategic underpricing model have not been 
examined before. The ex ante uncertainty hypothesis was tested by Mok and Hui (1998), but 
they tested only one proxy for ex ante uncertainty, i.e., the inverse of new funds raised. We 
consider 3 proxies−the standard deviation of after-market returns, the offer size and the age of 
firms, to examine the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis. In examining the signaling model, we test 
4 key empirical implications of the signaling model, 3 of which have been examined in Su and 
Fleisher (1999), but the methodology adopted and the conclusion made are different. 
       Using data from November 1995 to December 1998, our results show that the winner’s 
curse hypothesis is the main reason for the high IPO underpricing in China. The signaling 
hypothesis and manager’s strategic underpricing model do not stand in the Chinese market 
during the sample period. 
       The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a survey on the Chinese 
primary market and analyzes possible IPO underpricing models to be examined. Section 3 
formulates the hypotheses to be examined and methodology adopted. Section 4 describes the 
data and reports the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2   The Chinese Primary Market and Previous Studies 
      In this section we describe the institutional features of the IPO market in China, and survey 
research on this area. The hypotheses about IPO underpricing with respect to the China market 
will be summarized. 
2.1 Features of the Chinese Primary Market 
      The IPO decision in China is made on the basis of political considerations as well as 
profitability considerations. Every year, the Chinese authorities (the State Planning Committee, 
the Central Bank, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission) determine the total number 
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of issues allowed and the firms that can make issues.2 Next, each province is allocated a sub-
quota. Within each regional quota, the local security regulatory authorities invite enterprises to 
apply for listing and make selections based on some criteria (Yau and Steele, 2000). Once 
approval for an issue has been obtained an investment syndicate is formed to draw up a detailed 
plan. Securities companies then perform the standard services of providing advice, underwriting 
and distributing shares to the public, as well as developing a secondary market.  
       Going public is also a process of privatization for the state owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
China. The Chinese government introduces 5 major categories of shares to allow the ownership 
of the state-owned enterprises to be dispersed among the government itself, state-owned 
enterprises, firm’s own employees, domestic public and foreign investors. These are: (1) State 
shares, which are owned by the state and its various ministries, bureaus and regional 
governments. They are not tradable; (2) Legal entity shares, which can only be held by SEOs 
and/or the foreign partners of a corporatized joint venture. These shares are highly illiquid. They 
cannot be listed in the two official exchanges (Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE)); (3) Employee shares, which are shares issued by the listed companies 
and offered to managers and employees prior to offerings to the public; (4) Ordinary domestic 
shares or A-shares designated only for private Chinese citizens and traded on SHSE and SZSE; 
and (5) Foreign shares, which are designated only for foreign investors and are to be traded on 
security exchanges in China (B shares), Hong Kong (H shares) or New York (N shares). 3 
       The share offering mechanism in China has gone through several stages of reforms. The 
most commonly used method after 1995, however, is the online fixed price offering method 
called ‘Shang Wang Ding Jia’. This online fixed price offering method was first introduced in 
1994, in which investors bid for fixed quantities, with pro-rata allocation in the event of over-
subscription. Investors need to pay a full subscription deposit, with repayment for unsuccessful 
                                                 
2 The quota control policy was changed in 2001 when the local government or the ministries recommend issuing 
firms to CSRC for approval. 
3 The B-share market has been opened to the domestic residents since 19 February 2001. 
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applications around 1 week after subscription. It has become the major offering method from 
1996 to 2002.  
       The offer price in the online fixed price offering is chosen according to the formula of 
taking the after tax profits per share multiplied by a price earning ratio (PE), the latter being set 
in relation to the price earnings ratios of listed companies in the same locality and industry. 
However, The PE ratio changes in accordance with the guidance of the CSRC (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission). The CSRC often imposes a ceiling on the PE ratio, which prevents 
prices from being set in relation to an individual firm’s characteristics and growth potential. 
Moreover, the ceiling changed over time. Before 1999, the ceiling was fixed at 15. In January 
1999, the ceiling restriction was loosened and the PE ratio used in IPO pricing is raised to as 
high as 50. In 2002 a ceiling of 20 was re-imposed. In case of oversubscription investors are 
essentially chosen by balloting. The ballot ratio is determined by the number of shares publicly 
offered and the number of shares investors subscribed.  
       In China, almost all IPOs are oversubscribed due to an extremely high demand relative to its 
limited supply of new issues. Before the emergence of stock markets, Chinese households had 
access to very limited number of investment instruments, mainly savings deposits at relatively 
low interest rates. At the same time, China’s household savings rate, at about 40% of total 
disposable income, is one of the world’s highest. On the other hand, the aggregate value of new 
shares to be issued is limited by the national investment and credit plan. Therefore, there has 
been a persistent demand for new shares in China.  
       It is also noteworthy that seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are frequently observed among 
Chinese issuers and that SEOs account for a substantial portion of shares issued. About 91% of 
the Chinese firms that went public before 1 July 1994 issued seasoned equities before 1 January 
1996 (Su and Fleisher, 1999).  
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       Another characteristic of the Chinese stock market related to this study is that the 
accounting report and market regulatory system in China are relatively primitive and incomplete 
(Aharony et al., 2000; Xiang, 1998). The auditing standards in the Chinese stock market are 
generally perceived to be low (Aharony et al., 2000). There is far less corporate disclosure in 
China than in the developed markets. Private investors’ major source of information is the IPO 
prospectuses, which unfortunately are not reliable under the existing accounting and auditing 
standard. This causes difficulties for individual investors in evaluating an IPO before investing. 
Therefore, investors lack information about the true quality of the firm going public and there 
are big ex ante uncertainties about the issuing firm’s value. 
2.2 Prior Studies of the Chinese IPO Underpricing 
       Table 1 presents a summary of some studies on the underpricing of the Chinese IPO market. 
Using different data sets, these studies report that the mean initial returns range from 127% to 
949% and present a number of determinants of underpricing, including time gap, offering size, 
issuer’s fractional ownership, etc. Most of the studies examine only specific determining factors 
instead of testing the classical IPO underpricing hypotheses in a comprehensive way. Mok and 
Hui (1998) find that the high equity retention by the state, a long time-lag between offering and 
listing and ex ante risk of new issues were key determinants of IPO underpricing. Su and 
Fleisher (1999) examine the signaling model comprehensively and find that the Chinese IPO 
underpricing is a strategy for firms to signal their value to investors. They also investigate the 
effects of the offering mechanism on IPO underpricing and find that IPO underpricing is the 
largest under the lottery system with a fixed number of lottery forms and is the smallest under 
the auction mechanism.  A more recent study by Tian (2003) argues that the listing quota and 
pricing caps imposed by the government are major determinants of IPO underpricing. 
2.3 Possible Explanations for the Chinese A-share IPO Underpricing 
       In trying to explain why firms are floated at too low a price, researchers have produced a 
large theoretical and empirical literature. Jenkinson and Ljunqvist (2001) sum up most of the 
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studies on IPO underpricing. The classical IPO underpricing models can be divided into 3 
categories: asymmetric information models, institutional explanations, and ownership and 
control. Different models explain different situations in different countries. Some models are not 
possible explanations for IPO underpricing in a particular country because of the country’s stock 
market characteristics. The Chinese stock market characteristics determine that some IPO 
underpricing models do not apply in China, but the characteristics do provide a unique situation 
where certain models can be examined as well.   
       As shown above, the major offering mechanism in China does not have any pricing or 
rationing bias. This suggests that the ownership and control explanation will not apply since 
these two models need rationing discrimination as means to realize the control ends. 
       In the Chinese IPO market, there is no book building mechanism until 2001. Therefore, 
information revelation cannot possibly explain the high level of underpricing, at least not before 
2001. The lawsuit idea is a US-centric model. China did not have a complete securities law in 
force until July 1999; the risk of being sued is not economically significant. Therefore, the 
lawsuit hypothesis does not apply here. Price support is prohibited in the Chinese stock market; 
neither can price support underpricing explain the Chinese IPO underpricing.  
       As to the principal-agent hypothesis, on one hand underwriters do not have much market 
power to seek the information rent because of the competition in the Chinese underwriting line; 
on the other hand it is not a problem for underwriters to place all available stocks with investors 
due to the extremely high demand. Therefore, without rent seeking or moral hazard problems, 
the principal-agent model cannot possibly explain the Chinese IPO underpricing.  
       The winner’s curse problem is a possible explanation for the Chinese IPO underpricing. 
There are mainly two types of investors in the Chinese stock market: individual investors and 
institutional investors. The vast majority of investors in the Chinese market are individuals who 
can be regarded as uninformed investors, while the small portion of institutional investors may 
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function as informed investors. Rock’s winner’s curse model is examined only in countries 
where there are data on allocation rates (Koh and Walter, 1989; Levis, 1990; Keloharju, 1993; 
Amihud et al., 2003). In the Chinese market, the allocation-rate data are available. Indeed, in the 
China market all applications of different sizes have equal probability of being accepted and the 
probability (ballot ratio) is publicly announced after the IPOs. This feature enables us to 
examine the adverse selection model in the Chinese market.  
       Due to weakness in disclosure and auditing standards, investors lack information about the 
true quality of the firm going public. A relatively high degree of investor uncertainty affects the 
IPO pricing. The winner’s curse model, the signaling model and principal-agent model all 
suggest a positive correlation between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing. The winner’s curse 
model explains that an investor who decides to engage in information production implicitly 
invests in a call option on the IPO, which she will exercise if the ‘true’ price exceeds the strike 
price, the price at which the shares are offered to the public. The value of this option increases 
with valuation uncertainty, so more investors will become informed. This raises the required 
underpricing, since an increase in the number of informed traders aggravates the winner’s curse 
problem. The signaling model says that a noisier environment increases the extent of 
underpricing that is necessary to achieve separation. The principal-agent model implies the same 
because the more uncertain the value of the firm, the greater the asymmetry of information 
between issuer and underwriter, and thus the more valuable the underwriter’s services become, 
resulting in greater underpricing (Jenkinson and Ljunqvist, 2001). Mok and Hui (1998) argue 
that proxies for ex ante uncertainty explains the pattern of A-share IPO returns for a sample of 
87 Shanghai firms that went public during the years 1990-1993. Thus ex ante uncertainty could 
also be one of the main reasons for Chinese IPO underpricing. 
       The high degree of investor uncertainty means that the information asymmetry between the 
investors and the issuers is high. This provides incentives for good quality issuers to underprice 
in order to signal their firm value. Moreover the frequent observation of SEOs among Chinese 
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issuers also suggests that signaling may be a good explanation for underpricing. Su and Fleisher 
(1999) find that the signaling hypothesis explains the pattern of underpricing behavior among 
Chinese issuers rather well. Mok and Hui (1998) also find a positive relationship between the 
issuer’s ownership and IPO underpricing in support of the signaling hypothesis. 
       Aggarwal et al. (2001) propose underpricing as an agency cost to issuers, where managers 
strategically underprice new issues to maximize their own expected shareholding value at the 
lock up expiration. Managers underprice to create an information momentum, which shifts the 
demand curve for a firm’s stock outwards. This generates higher prices at the lockup expiration, 
when managers have their first opportunity to sell shares. As a result, managers accept 
substantial underpricing in order to maximize their personal wealth. Manager’s strategic 
underpricing may be an interesting hypothesis to investigate in the Chinese market. However, 
due to the lack of data for media coverage, only a preliminary test will be performed. Further 
examination will be a topic for future research. 
       In this study we focus on examining 4 possible models, namely, the winner’s curse model, 
the ex ante uncertainty explanation, the signaling model and the managers’ strategic 
underpricing explanation. Among these the winner’s curse model and the strategic underpricing 
model have not been tested before for the Chinese market. We shall test the ex ante uncertainty 
hypothesis using more proxies than in Mok and Hui (1998), and the overlapping implications 
from the 3 alternative explanations will be investigated.  Finally, the signaling model will be 
examined with a different methodology from that of Su and Fleisher (1999). 
3 Hypotheses and Methodology 
       We now summarize the hypotheses of the IPO underpricing in the China market, and 
discuss the methodology for testing these hypotheses. 
3.1 The Winner’s Curse Model 
       Rock’s (1986) asymmetric information model assumes that there are two groups of potential 
investors in the IPO markets: ‘informed’ and ‘uninformed’ investors. Informed investors bid 
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only for attractively priced IPOs; ‘uninformed’ investors apply for every new issue coming into 
the market indiscriminately. Thus, uninformed investors face competition for good shares, but 
have a higher probability of obtaining bad shares due to the rationing mechanism applied to 
oversubscribed offerings. Rock argues that the bias in rationing produces an equilibrium offer 
price with a finite discount sufficient to attract uninformed investors to the issue. Implicit in the 
winner’s curse model is the notion that, if properly adjusted for rationing and risk uninformed 
investors’ initial returns should be on average equal to the riskless rate, which is just enough to 
ensure their continued participation in the market.   
H1: After ration-adjustment, uninformed investors earn the riskless rate. 
       We assume that uninformed investors subscribe a fixed amount of shares for each and every 
IPO. Thus their allocation-weighted initial return, AWIR, is given by4 
1 0 1 0
0 0
P P I IAWIR BALLOT
P I
   − −= −      
                                             (1) 
where P1  is the closing price on the first day of trading, P0 is the IPO offer price, BALLOT is the 
ballot ratio used in lottery, and (I1 − I0) /I0 is the A-share composite index return from the IPO 
date to first trading date in the corresponding stock exchange, which is used as the proxy for the 
riskless rate. I1 is the closing price of the A-share composite index on the first trading date and I0 
is the closing price of the A-share composite index on the IPO date. Hypothesis H1 states that 
AWIR is approximately equal to the riskless rate of interest. 
       Rock’s winner’s curse model also implies a negative correlation between initial returns and 
allocations to investors. Since informed investors avoid overpriced IPOs, uninformed investors 
receive larger allocation of shares on which they earn low or negative returns, and smaller 
                                                 
4 In the fixed-price offering, unsuccessful parts of application deposit are refunded around one week after the IPO 
subscription date. However, since the interest rate is extremely low in the Chinese market (average one-week 
interest rate in the study period is close to zero, 0.039%) and there are few other investment opportunities, we treat 
the application deposit as frozen until the first trading date. 
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allocations in underpriced IPOs. Thus, the joint participation by both informed and uninformed 
investors in underpriced IPOs makes the demand for underpriced IPOs high, and allocation rate 
low. Our second hypothesis for Rock’s model pertains to the relation between underpricing and 
the allocation rate. 
H2:  IPO initial returns are inversely correlated with allocations to investors. 
       This relationship can be examined by the following simple linear regression  
0 1IR β β BALLOTT ε= + +      (2) 
where IR is the initial returns and BALLOTT is the logistic transformation of the ballot ratio:5 
log( ) /(1 )BALLOTT BALLOT α BALLOT α= + − +    (3)  
The logistic transformation is used here to accommodate the cases where BALLOT is practically 
0 or 1. We expect β1 in equation (2) to be negative and significant.  
3.2 Ex ante Uncertainty  
       Another key empirical implication of the winner’s curse model, pointed out by Ritter (1984) 
and formalized in Beatty and Ritter (1986), is that underpricing should increase in the ex ante 
uncertainty surrounding an issue. The underpinning is that higher uncertainty leads to 
proportionally more informed investors, which deteriorates the winner’s curse problem. Other 
testable implications of the winner’s curse model are basically elicited from this relation 
between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing. For example, Carter and Manaster (1990), 
Johnson and Miller (1988), James and Wier (1990) and many other researchers tested the 
relation between the underwriter’s reputation and initial returns as evidence of adverse selection. 
It is argued that more prestigious underwriters can reduce the informational asymmetry and 
thereby cut the underpricing cost. Another explanation is that hot issue periods are characterized 
by a higher level of ex ante uncertainty, necessitating higher underpricing (Ritter, 1984). 
However, these relationships are not unique to the winner’s curse model.  As discussed in 
                                                 
5 We use the same transformation as Amihud et al. (2003), where α  = 0.5/T with T being the sample size. 
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section 2, the principal-agent and signaling models imply similar results. Therefore, we will test 
the ex ante uncertainty explanation separately. 
       Researchers have used the variance of the after-market returns of IPOs (Ritter, 1984, 1987; 
Clarkson and Merkley,1994), the age of the firm at the time of offering (Ritter, 1984, 1991; 
Megginson and Weiss, 1991), the offer size (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; McGuinness, 1992) and 
the underwriter’s reputation (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Johnson and Miller, 1988; James and 
Wier, 1990) as proxies for measuring the ex ante uncertainty of the IPOs.  We are not going to 
use underwriter’s reputation as a proxy in this study because the Chinese A-share issues are 
underwritten by domestic state-owned security companies and there are no prestigious financial 
institutions with international reputations involved. The other 3 proxies for ex ante uncertainties 
predict that the larger the variance of the after-market returns of the IPOs, the younger the age of 
the issuing firms and the smaller the offering size, the higher the uncertainty about the value of 
IPO firms and therefore the more underpriced the corresponding IPOs. Thus we expect: 
H3: The standard deviation of the after-market returns of the IPOs is positively related to IPO 
underpricing. 
H4: The offer size of the firm is inversely related to IPO underpricing. 
H5: The age of the firm is inversely related to IPO underpricing. 
       We use multiple linear regression model to examine the explanatory power of ex ante 
uncertainty and control for other well-known determinants of IPO underpricing. The dependent 
variable is the market-adjusted initial return. The proxies for ex ante uncertainty are SD, AGE 
and IPOSZ, where SD is the standard deviation of returns over days 1 to 100 after IPO, AGE is 
the age of a firm in years from the establishment date to the date of IPO, and IPOSZ is the 
number of shares offered at the IPO times the IPO offer price.  
       Other variables that may affect the level of ex ante uncertainty are also controlled for.  The 
first one is the market return before IPO. There has been overwhelming evidence that 
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underpricing is higher in buoyant stock markets (Davis and Yeomans, 1976 (UK), Reilly, 1977 
(USA), and McGuiness, 1992 (Hong Kong)). To test if the Chinese IPOs are more heavily 
underpriced when the market is performing well, we use BFMARTN, the percentage change in 
the A-share composite index 3 months prior to the issue, as one of the explanatory variables. 
Another control variable is the issuers’ fractional ownership. In an emerging market with high 
information asymmetry, the domestic investors interpret a high percentage of equity retention by 
the state as government confidence and business guaranty. That is, high equity retention by the 
state lowers the ex ante uncertainty (Mok and Hui, 1998). OWNSHP is the proportion of shares 
owned by the government, legal entities and employees after the IPOs. The time gap elapsed 
between the IPO date and the first trading date can also affect the level of ex ante uncertainty. 
Chowdry and Sherman (1996) demonstrate that an increasing lag between the fixing of the offer 
price and the beginning of trading results in bigger ex ante uncertainty and more IPO 
underpricing. Mok and Hui (1998) and Su and Fleisher (1999) report a very large time gap 
between offering and listing in the Chinese market. Therefore, we add time lag from IPO date to 
the first trading date, LAG, as one of the independent variables. Other control variables include 
year dummies, industry dummies and the exchange dummy. Thus, we consider the following 
regression: 
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
ln ln
         96 97 2 3 4 6
IR β β SD β AGE β IPOSZ β BFMARTN β OWNSHP β LAG
β Y β Y β IN β IN β IN β IN β STKCDSH ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + (4)       
where the last 7 explanatory variables are dummy variables defined as below: 
Year:  Y96 equals to 1 for IPOs in 1996 (including 1 IPO in November and 1  
      in December 1995), Y97 are IPOs in 1997, and Y98 are IPOs in 1998. 
Industry: IN2 utilities, IN3 properties, IN4 conglomerates, IN5 industry, IN6 commerce 
Exchange: STKCDSH is a dummy for IPOs listed on the SHSE    
  STKCDSZ is a dummy for IPOs listed on the SZSE. 
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If H3, H4 and H5 hold, we expect β1 to be positive, and β2 and β3 to be negative. If the ex ante 
uncertainty hypothesis stands, we expect β4, β5 and β6 to be positive. 
3.3 Manager’s Strategic Underpricing 
       In China, the lockup periods for employee shares are typically 6 months or 3 years. If 
managers were to use information momentum to maximize the stock price upon expiration of 
lockups, the lockup period cannot be too long. As there would be too much uncertainty for 
managers during the 3-year lockup period, the information momentum strategy would not work. 
We assume that only managers of issuing firms with a 6-month lockup period are likely to adopt 
this strategy.  Therefore, if managers’ strategic underpricing exists, we would expect a higher 
underpricing for IPOs with a 6-month lockup period than those with 3 years. Two more dummy 
variables, LCK6MON and NOLCK, are added to equation (4) to examine preliminarily the 
strategic underpricing.  
        
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15
ln ln
96 97 2 3 4 6
6
IR β β SD β AGE β IPOSZ β BFMARTN β OWNSHP
β LAG β y β y β IN β IN β IN β IN
β STKCDSH β LCK MON β NOLCK ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
+ + + +
               (5) 
where LCK6MON equals to 1 if the employee share lockup period is 6 months and zero 
otherwise; NOLCK equals to 1 if no data available for employee share lockup period and zero 
otherwise. If managers in China do underprice to maximize their personal wealth upon the lock-
up expiration, we expect a positive β14. 
3.3 The Signaling Model 
       The signaling model assumes that the issuer has better information on securities value than 
the underwriters or investors. If the issuing firm is better informed about the present value and 
the risk of its future cash flows than the investors or underwriters, underpricing may become a 
means of convincing potential buyers of the “true” high value of the firm, i.e., underpricing is a 
signal for firm quality. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch 
(1989, 1996) contribute theories of this underpricing signaling model. They hypothesize that 
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underpricing allows “good” firms to distinguish themselves from “bad” firms and to improve the 
terms of future external financing. Under this assumption, good quality issuers are assumed to 
maximize the expected proceeds of a two-stage sale: they sell a fraction of the firm at flotation 
and the remainder in a SEO. In the words of Ibbotson (1975), issuers underprice in order to 
“leave a good taste in investors’ mouths”. With a positive probability, a firm’s true type is 
revealed before the post-IPO financing stage, introducing the risk to low-quality issuers that any 
cheating on their part will be detected before they can reap the benefit from the signal. This 
makes separation possible. Signaling true value is beneficial to a high-value company as it 
allows a higher price to be fetched at the second-stage sale if separation is achieved. Therefore, 
the signaling model leads to the empirical predictions:  
H6: Firms with more underpriced IPOs are more likely to issue seasoned equity than firms with 
less underpriced IPOs 
       A direct implication of the signaling model is that, in their eagerness to capitalize on the 
favorable news, high-quality firms will return to the capital market as soon as the opportunity 
comes, and to maximize the benefit. Thus, high-quality firms are more likely to reissue.  
H7: Firms with more underpriced IPOs are likely to issue seasoned equity more promptly than 
firms with less underpriced IPOs  
       The intuition behind is that it is more costly for high quality firms to defer their investments 
in new projects than for firms of low quality.  
       The signaling model implies empirically a positive association between underpricing and 
the success of the SEO. The success of SEO can be measured in terms of the SEO size relative 
to its IPO size and the market reaction to the seasoned issue.  This leads to our hypotheses 8 and 
9. 
H8: Firms with more underpriced IPOs are likely to issue larger amount of seasoned equity than 
firms with less underpriced IPOs 
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H9: Firms with more underpriced IPOs are likely to experience a less unfavorable price 
reaction to SEO announcement than firms with less underpriced IPOs 
       Hypothesis H9 follows from the notion that firms with higher IPO underpricing are more 
likely to return with seasoned equity issue and hence investors are more prepared for or less 
surprised by their SEOs. 
       There is, however, an alternative explanation for the existence of the above relations 
between IPO underpricing and SEO activity. In fact, the market feedback hypothesis posits that 
the market is better informed than the issuer and hence a high return on the IPO date implies that 
the issuer has underestimated the marginal return to the project. The issuer uses this information 
and increases the scale of the project by raising additional capital through seasoned offerings. 
The abnormal share price changes during the after-market period should have the same effect on 
future equity issues as price changes on the issue date. The issuers can adjust their seasoned 
equity offering strategies by looking at the after-market stock performance. To explore whether 
the relations between IPO underpricing and SEO activity can be explained by market feedback 
hypotheses, we examine whether the returns in 400 trading days after the IPOs, AFTRTN, are 
related to subsequent offerings. We choose a 400-day post-IPO window to measure the after-
market returns because the cross-sectional standard deviation of the after-market returns in the 
400-day window is about the same as the cross-sectional standard deviation of the IPO date 
returns, which suggests that the same amount of information is revealed to the market during 
these two periods. This follows the suggestions by Jegadeesh (1993), whereas Su and Fleisher 
(1999) use only 10-day after-market returns to test the market feedback hypothesis. As there is 
comparatively too little information revealed in such a short time than that revealed on the initial 
trading date, it is not appropriate to compare the effect of the two variables on SEO activities. 
Following Jegadeesh et al. (1993), we test H6 using a logit model: 
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            0 1 2 3 4 5
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+ + + + + +           (6) 
where Pseo is the probability that a firm issues seasoned equity after the initial offering. The first 
two independent variables are market-adjusted initial return (underpricing) and the after-market 
abnormal return over the period from trading day 1 to trading day 400 after the IPO date. The 
after-market abnormal return equals to market-adjusted return over the same period. Since firms 
with a small IPO size are more likely to come to seasoned equity offering, we include the natural 
logarithm of the IPO size as an additional explanatory variable. Finally, we also control for 
potential differences in SEO activity across years, industries and exchanges. We expect a 
positive β1 if H6 is true and a positive β2 if market feedback hypothesis is true. 
       To examine the relationship between the time elapsed between IPO and SEO, TIMESEO, 
and IPO underpricing, we use a tobit model with right censoring. For firms with no SEOs over 
the years from 1996 through 2001, we assume that the time it takes for their re-issuance is 
infinity. For firms that issue their first SEOs during that period, the maximum time elapsed 
between IPO and SEO in our sample is 1394 days. Therefore, we take ln(1400) as the right 
censoring value. The explanatory variables are the same as those in the previous logit model. Su 
and Fleisher also use a tobit model to test the same hypothesis. But for IPOs with no seasoned 
equity offerings, they take TIMESEO value as zero and use a left censoring test, which is 
inaccurate. We consider the model 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10
ln 96 97 2 3
ln 4 6 ln1400
β β IR β AFTRTN β IPOSZ β Y β Y β IN β IN
TIMESEO β IN β IN β STKCDSH ε if RHS
otherwise
+ + + + + + + += + + + < ∞
      (7)   
We expect a negative β1 if H7 is true and a negative β2 if market feedback hypothesis is true. 
       To test H8 we use a tobit model similar to Jegadeesh et al. (1993). The tobit model specifies 
the relation between the relative size of seasoned offering and the explanatory variables as 
follows:  
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     (8) 
where SEOSZ is the number of shares offered at the first SEO times the SEO price,  and 
SEOSZ/IPOSZ is the relative size of the SEO. The independent variables are the same as those in 
the logit model. Similarly, we expect a positive β1 if H6 is true and a positive β2 if the market 
feedback hypothesis holds. 
       To examine the excess return around the date when the firm announces its SEO, we estimate 
the excess return, REACT, over the event days −1 through +4, where day 0 is the SEO 
announcement date. REACT equals to [(P4 − P−1)/P−1] − [(I4 − I−1)/I−1], where P4 is the 4th day 
closing price of the stock and I4 is the 4th day closing price of the corresponding exchange A-
share composite index after the SEO announcement (the SEO announcement date is taken as the 
publishing date of the SEO prospectus). P−1 and I−1 are the stock price and index price 1 day 
before the SEO announcement. 
       Moreover we include a variable TIMESEO, which measures the number of days between the 
IPO date and the SEO date. The longer the time between these events, the greater the volume of 
public information released about the firm, thus reducing the uncertainty about the firm value. 
Additional independent variables are SEOSZ/MKT, which is the SEO size over the stock market 
value 1 day before the SEO announcement and SEOPRC/TRDPRC, which is the SEO price over 
the closing price 1 day before the SEO announcement. These variables are included to control 
for possible differences in the extent to which the market is surprised by the SEO 
announcements that are not related to the initial returns of their IPOs or their after-market 
returns. For firms with SEOs, we do the following regression to examine H9: 
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12 13 14
ln 96 97
    2 3 4 6 ln
    ln / /
REAC T β β IR β AFTRTN β IPO SZ β Y β Y
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= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + +
             (9) 
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Similarly, we expect a positive β1 if H9 is true and a positive β2 if the market feedback 
hypothesis is true. 
4 Data and Empirical Results 
4.1 Data  
       To pursue the objectives of this study, we examine all online fixed price and firm 
commitment A-Share IPOs over the period November 1995 - December 1998. Financial 
institutions and close-end funds are excluded. Online fixed price offering is the most commonly 
used offering method in Chinese A-share IPOs. The study of the online fixed price IPOs can 
represent the general IPO market in China. We exclude the IPOs after 1999 to obtain sufficient 
after-market data for testing the signaling model. To do this, we need at least 3 years’ time for 
the listed firms to issue their first seasoned equity offerings. The sample period ends in 1998, 
which also helps control for government intervention in the pricing of IPOs since after 1998 
there was a policy change in the ceiling for the PE ratio. The data come from several sources, 
including the trading database from GTA (Guo Tai An Information Technology Co.), the IPO 
database from Haitong Securities and the panorama network website (www.p5w.net). Finally a 
sample of 343 IPOs are collected, representing a broad spectrum of industries such as utilities, 
properties, conglomerates, industry and commerce. Descriptive statistics are reported in panel A 
of table 2. The mean and median offering sizes of the IPOs (i.e., gross proceeds) are RMB 304 
million and RMB 220 million, respectively. The average proportion of shares retained by the 
state, legal entities and employees is 71.04%, indicating that the majority of shareholding of 
equities are non-negotiable government shares and legal entities shares. The average age of IPO 
firms is 3 years. The mean PE ratio used in IPO pricing and the average offer price are 14.85 and 
6.19, respectively.  
       215 out of the 343 IPOs issue their first SEOs in the period 1996 to 2001. In other words, 
over 60% of the sample of IPOs issue SEOs. All the 215 SEOs included in our study are rights 
offers (SEOs to the existing shareholders). Public seasoned offering (SEOs to the general public 
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investors) are rarely seen in China because public seasoned offerings are not permitted until 
1997. Even after the restriction was lifted, very few firms use public offerings in their re-
issuances. Some characteristics of the SEO data are reported in panel B of table 2. The average 
SEO price is RMB 8.79 and the average SEO size is RMB 248.27 million. The mean and 
minimum time it takes from IPO to SEO is 805 days and 441 days, respectively. 
       To measure the level of IPO underpricing, we use the market-adjusted initial return, i.e., the 
raw initial return after taking into account the overall market effect. The raw initial return 
RAWIR is calculated as: 
1 0 0( ) /RAWIR P P P= −  
Market adjusted initial return equals to RAWIR minus the A-share composite index return from 
the IPO date to its first trading date. 
001 /)( IIIRAWIRIR −−=  
where I1 is the closing price of the SHSE A-share composite index or SZSE A-share composite 
index on the first trading day of the new issue, and I0 is the closing price of the SHSE A-share 
composite index or SZSE A-share composite index on the IPO date.  
To examine a longer-term IPO after-market performance, we calculate initial returns over 10 and 
100 trading days after the IPO as 
    00100010 /)(/)(10 IIIPPPIR −−−=  
and    0010000100 /)(/)(100 IIIPPPIR −−−=  
Some summary statistics for the initial excess returns are presented in table 3 and the 
distribution of IR is depicted in figure 1. The average IR is positive and significant: the mean is 
123.59% with t = 27.00. Only 7 out of 343 IPOs have negative initial returns. Nearly 98% of the 
IPOs have positive initial returns. The average 10-day and 100-day initial excess returns, IR10 
and IR100, are 119.27% and 123.79%, respectively. This is much lower than what was reported 
in previous studies, showing that the Chinese new issue market has indeed improved its 
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efficiency. IR10 is slightly lower than IR, and IR100 is slightly higher than IR. Notably, the 
mean initial return from day +1 to day +100 is not significantly different from zero (mean = 
−1.72%, t = −0.93). If the price of a new issue at the opening of trade represents an overreaction 
or speculative bubble rather than the true economic or fundamental price, we should witness a 
significant decline in the stock return in the after-market. However, we do not see a statistical 
difference between IR and IR100, which suggests that there is no momentum effect in pricing. 
The correlation between IR and the subsequent initial returns from day +1 to day +100 is 0.114, 
indicating that the price of the IPO stocks adjusts efficiently after the IPO. All 3 initial return 
distributions are positively skewed, reflecting the very high returns obtained in a few cases (see 
figure 1).  
       Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the initial returns and the PE ratios used in IPO 
pricing by year and by stock exchange. There are only 2 observations in 1995 and we include 
these into the data for 1996. The average initial returns in 1996, 1997 and 1998 are 95.87%, 
144.96% and 130.57%, respectively. The significant difference in underpricing across years is 
mainly caused by the changes in the IPO pricing policy over time. As discussed before, the offer 
price in the Chinese fixed price offering is determined by the multiplication of PE ratio of the 
same industry and the issuing firm’s after-tax profit per share. A ceiling was imposed by the 
supervisory authorities and the ceiling changed over time. Table 4 shows that the PE ratios used 
in 1996 are significantly higher than that in 1997 and 1998. We will not analyze in detail why 
the initial return in 1996 is lower than that of 1997 and 1998 or why the IPOs in 1997 are more 
underpriced than IPOs in 1998 since the policy changes are complicated. There is not much 
difference in the initial returns and PE ratios across the two stock exchanges. 
4.2 Allocation and Adverse Selection 
       The pro rata allocation rate in China is the ballot ratio used in the lottery and equals to the 
ratio of the number of shares publicly offered in the IPO to the number of shares subscribed by 
investors. There is no under-subscription in the sample. BALLOT denotes the ballot ratio 
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(allocation rate). Some summary statistics of BALLOT are presented in table 5, and the pattern of 
its distribution is depicted in figure 2.   
       The ballot ratio in most IPOs is extremely small due to the overwhelming oversubscription. 
The overwhelming oversubscription is mainly caused by surplus demand for the limited supply 
of negotiable shares. Moreover, the vast majority of the primary market investors are relatively 
unsophisticated private individual investors. The characteristics of Chinese individual investors 
and the weakness in information disclosure result in a very big proportion of uninformed 
investors in the Chinese market. The distribution shows that the allocation rate in most IPOs 
(95%) is below 5% and there are only a few cases with ballot ratio greater than that. The mean 
for BALLOT in our sample is 2.18% and the median is much lower, 0.65%. The average 
allocation rate for overpriced IPOs is 34%, which is much higher than that of the underpriced 
IPOs (1.51%). This is consistent with the winner’s curse theory that the uninformed investors 
have a higher probability of obtaining overpriced IPOs. However, this is weak evidence of the 
presence of winner’s curse problem since we have only 7 overpriced IPOs. 
       If H1 is true, the allocation-weighted initial returns minus the riskless rate should be 
approximately zero. The statistics for AWIR are presented in table 3. The mean of AWIR is 
negative (−0.33%), and is not statistically different from zero (t = −0.63). This suggests that, 
despite the seemingly high initial returns, uninformed IPO investors essentially break even. 
       The OLS regression result for equation (2) is as follows: 
2
0.67 0.41
      ( 2.74) ( 7.94)     0.1535
IR BALLOTT
R
= − −
− − =  
The estimated coefficient for BALLOTT is −0.41, with t = −7.94. The strong inverse relationship 
between initial returns and allocations to investors is again consistent with Rock’s hypothesis of 
adverse selection. 
The above two empirical results confirm the major empirical implications of Rock’s theory. We 
conclude that individual investors in China face the winner’s curse problem. However, without 
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data on application sizes and other details, it is not clear who the informed investors in the 
Chinese IPO market are. 
4.3 Ex ante Uncertainty and Manager’s Strategic Underpricing 
       Model 1 of table 6 presents the regression results for equation (4). Consistent with H3, the 
coefficient for the standard deviation of the after-market returns is positive and strongly 
significant. The coefficients for lnAGE and lnIPOSZ are both negative and significant, which 
supports the ex ante uncertainty hypotheses H4 and H5, namely, the age and offer size of the 
issuing firm are inversely related to IPO underpricing in the Chinese IPO market.  
       The coefficient of BFMARTN is positive and significant at the 5% level, which means that 
the IPOs are more underpriced in hot market. This is consistent with previous studies (Davis and 
Yeomans, 1976 (UK), Reilly, 1977 (USA), and McGuiness, 1992 (Hong Kong)). The coefficient 
of OWNSHP is negative and significant, consistent with Mok and Hui (1998). This shows that 
Chinese investors interpret high state and legal entity retention as government support and 
business guaranty. That is, high equity retention lowers the ex ante uncertainty about firm value, 
thereby lowers the required level of underpricing. The time lag between the IPO date and the 
first trading date is insignificant in explaining IPO underpricing in the regression. Different from 
Mok and Hui (1998) and Su and Fleisher (1999)’s sample, the time lag after 1996 has been 
dramatically shortened, which removes previous uncertain factors caused by the extreme long 
time lag.6  
       The positive and significant coefficient for the dummy variable Y96 shows that the IPOs 
made in 1996 are less underpriced than the IPOs in 1998. This might be affected by the changes 
of the PE ratio used in IPO pricing. There is no statistical difference in underpricing across 
industries. The IPO underpricing in SHSE is significantly higher than that in SZSE. As we have 
seen in table 4, there is not much difference in the PE ratio used in IPO pricing across the two 
                                                 
6 The average lag time in our sample is only 32 days, which is much shorter than the average of 260 days reported 
in Su and Fleisher’s (1999) study. The much shorter lag time from the IPO date to the first listing date in our sample 
shows that the online fixed pricing offering method is more efficient than previously used offering methods.  
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exchanges. Thus, this cannot be caused by the difference in the PEs. One explanation is that 
many firms at SZSE are joint ventures, while those listed at SHSE are mostly SOEs. There are 
relatively more disclosure and less uncertainty in joint venture firms. That is why IPOs listed on 
SZSE are less underpriced. The model explains 96.7% of the variability in initial returns of the 
sample of A-share IPOs, which shows the strong explanatory power of ex ante uncertainty. This 
supports our hypothesis that the high ex ante uncertainty in IPO value is the main reason for the 
high level of IPO underpricing observed in the Chinese market. 
       Model 2 in table 6 reports our preliminary results for the strategic underpricing model. The 
positive sign for LCK6MON is as expected but it is not statistically significant, suggesting that 
there is no statistical difference in the underpricing level between IPOs with 6-month lockup 
period and those with 3-year lockup period. Therefore, manager’s strategic underpricing may not 
be a good explanation for Chinese IPO underpricing. 
4.4 The Signaling Model  
       Table 7 presents the logit regression test for the relation between IPO underpricing and the 
probability of seasoned equity issue (equation (6)). The slope coefficient (t-statistics) on the 
variable IR is −0.07 (−0.40). The slope coefficient for AFTRTN (t-statistics) is 0.86 (3.97). For 
H6, the signaling hypothesis expects a positive and significant role of IPO initial return in 
explaining the likelihood of issuing subsequent equity offerings. However, we find a negative 
and insignificant coefficient for the initial returns. This suggests that the signaling model does 
not stand. At the same time, the estimates show a strong relation between the after-market price 
appreciation and the likelihood of SEOs. In other words, the coefficient for AFTRTN suggests 
that the higher the after-market returns, the more likely the listed firm re-issue. This is consistent 
with the market feedback hypothesis. Other two significant variables are Y96 and Y97, which 
means that IPOs in 1996 and 1997 are more likely to issue SEOs than those in 1998. This is 
probably because IPOs in 1996 and 1997 have longer time for SEOs than those in 1998. The rest 
of the dummy variables are insignificant and their coefficients are jointly not different from zero. 
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Therefore, we report a second logit regression excluding those insignificant dummy variables in 
Model 2 of table 7. Model 2 reflect almost the same result as that of model 1 except that the 
significance level for dummy variable Y96 decreases. 
       The right censoring tobit regression examining H7 is presented in table 8. The slope 
coefficient estimate for IR is 0.04, with t = 0.83. The sign of IR is opposite to our expectation 
and the t-statistics is insignificant. This again shows that the signaling model does not stand in 
the Chinese market. The coefficient for AFTRTN is negative (−0.17) and statistically different 
from zero at the 1% level (t = −4.42). This result indicates that firms that experience large price 
appreciation after the IPOs are likely to raise larger amounts of capital through seasoned equity 
issues. This is again consistent with the market feedback hypothesis. 
       Model 1 of table 9 reports the tobit regression estimates examining the relation between the 
size of the seasoned offerings and the explanatory variables (equation (8)). The estimate (t-
statistic) of the slope coefficient for the variable IR is 0.02 (0.15), which indicates that the excess 
initial returns in the IPOs are weak in explaining the relative SEO size and H8 is rejected. Same 
as the previous logit regression, we find a positive (0.46) and significant (t = 4.84) coefficient 
for AFTRTN. Consistent with our previous findings, the market feedback hypothesis is verified 
for the Chinese A-share market. The tobit regression also shows that IPOSZ is negative (−0.37) 
and significant (t = −2.85) in explaining the relative SEO size. The coefficients (t-statistics) for 
year dummy variables Y96 and Y97 are 0.6 (2.67) and 0.72 (3.97), respectively, indicating that 
the IPOs in 1996 and 1997 raise higher amount of capital through seasoned equity issues than 
the IPOs in the year 1998. Another significant dummy variable is IN6 suggesting that 
commercial firms raise smaller amount of capital in SEOs than industrial firms. There is no 
statistical difference in the two stock exchanges. Therefore we report a second tobit regression 
excluding STKCDSH in model 2 of table 9, which shows almost the same results as those of 
model 1. 
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       To examine the relation among the stock-price response to the announcement of seasoned 
equity offerings, underpricing and after-market returns, we first use a sub-sample of 215 IPOs 
with subsequent offerings to run the OLS regression. The results are presented in model 1 of 
table 10. The estimated coefficient for IR is positive, as expected, but statistically insignificant (t 
= 1.69). This indicates that underpricing the IPO does not significantly mitigate the negative 
share-price response to a first seasoned equity offering. The estimate of the coefficient for the 
variable AFTRTN is also not significantly different from zero. The rest of the explanatory 
variables are insignificant. The adjusted R2 is 0.0089, which shows that the regression has very 
weak explanatory power. This is not surprising in the Chinese market because the seasoned 
equity offering news is normally leaked out long time before the publication of the SEO 
announcement. Usually months before a re-issuance, a board meeting is held to discuss the re-
issuance decision and the meeting resolution is published the next day after the meeting. 
Therefore, by the time of SEO prospectus publication, the SEO news is not new and the stock 
price has already adjusted. 
       Model 1 of table 10 examines only 215 firms with their first SEOs within 3 years of IPO. 
This is only a subset of our larger population. The decision to make subsequent offerings is 
endogenous, which is not reflected in the cross-sectional estimates of model 1.  Therefore the 
estimator may be inconsistent as a result of truncation bias. Eckbo et al. (1990) derive consistent 
estimators using a latent variable model. These estimators account for the presence of the 
potential truncation bias. Michaley and Shaw (1994) use this method to detect the dividend 
announcement effect. We also adopt the same model to further examine H9.  
       Firstly, a probit regression is estimated as followings: 
εγ += ZSEOD  
where Z denotes the independent variables, which are IR, AFTRTN, Ln(IPOSZ), Y96 and Y97. 
They are related to the likelihood that a SEO will be issued. Then we calculate the Mill’s ratio 
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MILLSRATIO as φ(Zγ)/Ф(Zγ), where φ is the normal density function and Ф is the normal 
cumulative distribution function.  
By adding MILLSRATIO as one more explanatory variable into equation (9), consistent 
parameters can be obtained: 
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ln 96 97 2
3 4 6 ln ln
/ /
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           (10) 
       The estimation result of equation (10) is presented in model 2 of table 10. Same as our 
regression in model 1, the slope coefficient for IR and AFTRTN are still insignificant. This 
verifies the fact that more underpriced IPOs do not experience a less unfavorable price reaction 
to SEO announcement than firms with less underpriced IPOs. Thus H9 is rejected. 
       In summary, the relations between IPOs and SEOs activities in the Chinese market are 
mainly caused by the after-market performances of stocks instead of the issuer’s signaling 
behavior. The signaling hypothesis does not stand in the Chinese A-share market, while the 
market feedback hypothesis is supported.  
5 Conclusions 
 
       This study examines the degree of underpricing for 343 online fixed price offerings from 
November 1995 to December 1998. The initial return is on average 123.59%, much lower than 
the level in early 1990s reported in previous studies. This indicates that the efficiency in the 
primary market has improved. However, it is still larger than what is found in most emerging 
markets. 
       We investigate possible explanations for the level of underpricing. We analyze possible 
explanations for the Chinese market according to the characteristics of the Chinese market and 
examine all major models, i.e., the winner’s curse model, the ex ante uncertainty explanation, 
the signaling model, and manager’s strategic underpricing model. 
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       Consistent with the winner’s curse model, after adjusting for rationing, uninformed 
investors in the Chinese market essentially break even. The negative relation between the initial 
returns and the allocation rates to investors also suggest that Chinese individual investors face 
the winner’s curse problem. Using several proxies for ex ante uncertainty, we find ex ante 
uncertainty has very high explanatory power in explaining the Chinese IPO underpricing. This is 
consistent with Mok and Hui (1998)’s assertion. A preliminary test of the manager’s strategic 
underpricing model suggests that there is no significant difference in IPO underpricing between 
firms with a lockup period of 6 months and 3 years, which indicates that managers’ behavior of 
maximizing their value upon the expiration of the lock-up period does not exist in China.  
       After an extensive examination of 4 hypotheses of the signaling model, we conclude that the 
signaling model does not stand in the Chinese market. Evidence shows that the relations 
between IPO underpricing and SEO activities are caused by the market feedback information. 
This is contrary to Su and Fleisher (1999)’s findings. 
       In all, the main reasons for the Chinese A-share IPO underpricing are investor’s high level 
of ex ante uncertainty about IPO value and the winner’s curse problem. As we have eliminated 
the possibility of the principal-agent and the signaling explanation, we conclude that the positive 
relation between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing is evidence in support of the winner’s 
curse problem. This suggests that reducing issuing firms’ ex ante uncertainty, such as through 
more information disclosure from IPO firms, will help to ameliorate the winner’s curse problem 
and thereby lower the level of underpricing. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics on 343 IPOs in the 1996-1998 period and 215 SEOs in the period 1996-2001  
Variable  No. 
Obs. 
Mean  Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
dev. 
Skewness 
Panel A  IPO characteristics       
IPOSZ (million RMB) 343 304.00 220.50 2625.00 33.00 310.00 3.60 
OWNSHP  343 0.7104 0.7353 0.8649 0.3670 0.0721 -1.2751 
AGE ( years) 343 3.06 2.03 40.99 0.10 3.27 6.08 
PE 343 14.85 14.57 32.52 8.80 2.51 0.76 
LAG ( days) 343 32.43 21.00 377.00 9.00 35.09 6.02 
P0 343 6.19 5.99 15.70 2.45 1.83 1.38 
P1 343 13.71 12.74 53.57 4.41 6.01 1.90 
BFMARRTN 343 0.1583 0.1076 0.8649 -0.2859 0.2407 0.6655 
AFTRTN 343 0.1482 -0.0210 3.9045 -3.0145 0.7575 1.3241 
        
Panel B  SEO characteristics       
SEOSZ (million RMB) 215 248.27 188.10 1395.00 2.08 206.07 2.49 
SEOPRC 215 8.79 8.00 26.00 3.30 3.50 1.60 
TIMESEO (days) 215 805 805 1394 441 219.44 0.55 
REACT 215 -0.0109 -0.0144 0.2672 -0.1308 0.0472 1.2076 
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Table 3:  Initial returns in IPOs, with adjustment for allocation 
  Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness 
Initial return 
(underpricing) 
       
1 IR 1.2359 1.1123 8.2050 -0.1211 0.8479 2.4129 
  (27.00)      
2 IR10 1.1927 1.0619 5.6548 -0.1886 0.8372 1.5264 
  (26.38)      
3 IR100 1.2379 1.0192 5.4331 -0.8410 0.9145 1.1342 
  (25.07)      
Allocation-weighted initial return     
4 AWIR -0.0033 -0.0050 0.3652 -0.3621 0.0955 -0.1360 
    (-0.63)           
 
The figures in the parentheses are the t-statistics. 
 
 
  
Table 4:  Statistics of initial returns and PE ratios by year and by stock exchange 
  Years Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness 
1996 (121)       
 IR 0.96 0.95 3.37 -0.12 0.90 
 PE 15.34 14.90 32.52 9.70 0.26 
1997 (125)      
 IR 1.45 1.29 4.64 0.01 1.46 
 PE 14.67 14.90 18.00 10.00 -0.16 
1998 (97)       
 IR 1.31 1.13 8.20 -0.05 3.25 
 PE 14.48 14.50 18.00 8.80 0.20 
Shanghai (170)      
 IR 1.20 1.11 4.31 -0.12 1.05 
 PE 14.86 14.57 32.52 8.80 3.13 
Shenzhen (173)      
 IR  1.27 1.13 8.20 -0.11 2.86 
 PE 14.84 14.57 27.96 11.35 -0.59 
 
The figures in the parentheses are the number of IPOs in that year or in that stock exchange. 
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Table 5:  Statistics of allocations in sample IPOs 
   Mean Median Maximum Minimum Obs. 
BALLOT   0.0218 0.0065 0.9540 0.0013 343 
        
Ballot classified by initial return     
        
For IR < 0; Ballot  0.3432 0.0851 0.954 0.0057 7 
For IR > 0; Ballot  0.0151 0.0065 0.7315 0.0013 336 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: OLS regression Analysis Investigating ex ante Uncertainty and Other  
                Significant Explanatory Variables of IPO Underpricing  
Dependent Variable: IR Model 1  Model 2 
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat.   Coeff. t stat.  
 Constant 0.8331 2.64 
***  0.8631 2.70 
*** 
 SD 9.9021 78.61 
***  9.8944 78.12 
*** 
 LNAGE -0.0312 -3.23 
***  0.0952 2.35 
*** 
 LNIPOSZ -0.0340 -2.23 
**  -0.0251 -2.09 
** 
 BFMARRTN 0.0985 2.45 
**  -0.0358 -2.32 
** 
 OWNSHP  -0.2875 -2.44 
**  -0.3005 -2.48 
** 
 LAG 0.0003 0.90   0.0003 0.99  
 Y96 -0.1937 -6.56 
***  -0.1904 -6.19 
*** 
 Y97 -0.0091 -0.39   -0.0096 -0.39  
 IN2 -0.0031 -0.09   -0.0023 -0.07  
 IN3 0.0029 0.03   0.0065 0.07  
 IN4 0.0109 0.47   0.0123 0.53  
 IN6 -0.0546 -1.71   -0.0517 -1.59  
  STKCDSH 0.0517 2.93 
***   0.0501 2.80 
*** 
 LCK6MON     0.0194 0.73  
 NOLCK     -0.0039 -0.14  
Adjusted R²    0.9671      0.9670   
 
** Significant t statistics at the 5% level 
*** Significant t statistics at the 1% level 
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 Table 7:  Logit Model to Test the Relation between Underpricing and the Likelihood of SEO 
Dependent Variable: SEOD Model 1   Model 2 
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat.   Coeff. t stat.  
 Constant 4.05 0.88   3.02 0.67  
 IR -0.07 -0.40   -0.07 -0.40  
 AFTRTN 0.86 3.97 ***  0.81 3.89 *** 
 LOG(IPOSZ) -0.23 -1.00   -0.17 -0.77  
 Y96 1.02 2.61 ***  0.98 2.53 ** 
 Y97 1.46 4.78 ***  1.39 4.69 *** 
 IN2 -0.12 -0.25      
 IN3 1.52 1.20      
 IN4 0.16 0.45      
 IN6 -0.90 -1.95      
  STKCDSH 0.16 0.67           
 
 215 observations with Dep = 1, the total number of observations is 343. 
 ** Significant t statistics at the 5% level 
 *** Significant t statistics at the 1% level 
 
 
       Table 8:  Tobit Regression to Examine the Relation between Time to SEO and IPO Underpricing 
Dependent Variable: LNTIMESEO    
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat.  
 Constant 7.44 6.98 *** 
 IR 0.04 0.83  
 AFTRTN -0.17 -4.42 *** 
 LOG(IPOSZ) -0.01 -0.21  
 Y96 -0.38 -4.18 *** 
 Y97 -0.35 -4.85 *** 
 IN2 0.09 0.83  
 IN3 -0.40 -1.34  
 IN4 -0.05 -0.62  
 IN6 0.28 2.49 ** 
 STKCDSH 0.00 0.07  
Adjusted R²   0.1248     
 
Total observations are 343 and right-censored observations are 128. 
** Significant t statistics at the 5% level 
*** Significant t statistics at the 1% level 
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Table 9:  Tobit Regression to Examine the Relationship between SEO Size and IPO Underpricing 
Dependent Variable: SEOSZ/IPOSZ Model 1  Model 2 
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat.   Coeff. t stat.  
 Constant 7.05 2.68 ***  7.08 2.69 *** 
 IR 0.02 0.15   0.02 0.15  
 AFTRTN 0.46 4.84 ***  0.46 4.82 *** 
 LOG(IPOSZ) -0.37 -2.85 ***  -0.38 -2.87 *** 
 Y96 0.60 2.67 ***  0.60 2.67 *** 
 Y97 0.72 3.97 ***  0.72 4.01 *** 
 IN2 0.25 0.88   0.23 0.83  
 IN3 1.04 1.41   1.06 1.43  
 IN4 -0.05 -0.25   -0.06 -0.32  
 IN6 -0.54 -2.00 **  -0.54 -1.99 ** 
 STKCDSH -0.07 -0.49      
Adjusted R²    0.1440       0.1434   
 
Total number of observations is 343,the number of left censored observations is 128. 
** Significant t statistics at the 5% level 
*** Significant t statistics at the 1% level 
 
 
 
Table 10:  OLS Regression to Test the Price Reaction at the Announcement of SEO 
Dependent Variable: REACT Model 1  Model 2 
Explanatory Variables:  Coeff. t stat.  Coeff. t stat.  
 Constant -0.35 -1.98 ** -0.09 -1.04  
 IR 0.01 1.69  0.00 1.59  
 AFTRTN 0.00 0.12  0.00 0.41  
 LNIPOSZ 0.00 0.51  0.00 0.94  
 Y96 0.02 1.61  0.01 0.82  
 Y97 0.00 -0.08  0.00 0.08  
 IN2 -0.01 -0.76  0.00 -0.40  
 IN3 0.04 1.14  0.03 1.12  
 IN4 -0.01 -1.06  -0.01 -0.99  
 IN6 -0.01 -1.03  -0.01 -0.86  
 STKCDSH 0.00 -0.19  0.00 -0.37  
 LNTIMESEO 0.02 0.81  0.00 -0.03  
 LNSEOSZ 0.02 1.54  0.00 0.44  
 SEOSZ/MKT -0.03 -1.25  -0.01 -0.85  
 SEOPRC/TRDPRC -0.04 -1.71  -0.04 -2.29  ** 
 MILLS RATIO    0.00 0.22  
Adjusted R²    0.0089      0.0177    
 
The number of observations is 215 for model A and 343 for model B. 
** Significant t statistics at the 5% level 
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               Figure 1:  The distribution of the initial excess return in IPOs 
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            Figure 2:  The Distribution of Allocations to Investors in IPOs 
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Appendix A: Correlation Matrix 
 
Table a: Correlation matrix of continuous explanatory variables in equation (4) 
 IR SD LNAGE LNIPOSZ BFMARRTN OWNSHP LAG 
IR 1.00       
SD 0.98 1.00      
LNAGE 0.01 0.07 1.00     
LNIPOSZ -0.28 -0.33 -0.28 1.00    
BFMARRTN 0.11 0.13 0.14 -0.30 1.00   
OWNSHP 0.00 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 1.00  
LAG 0.20 0.18 -0.12 0.09 -0.23 0.02 1.00 
 
 
 
Table b: Correlation matrix of continuous explanatory variables in equation (6) 
 IR AFTRTN LNIPOSZ 
IR 1.00   
AFTRTN -0.09 1.00  
LNIPOSZ -0.28 -0.19 1.00 
 
 
Table c: Correlation matrix of continuous explanatory variables in equation (9) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) IR                  1.00       
(2) AFTRTN -0.14 1.00      
(3) LNIPOSZ -0.22 -0.23 1.00     
(4) LNTIMESEO             0.26 -0.08 -0.06 1.00    
(5) LNSEOSZ               -0.18 0.05 0.51 -0.01 1.00   
(6) SEOSZ/MKT            -0.19 -0.17 -0.03 -0.15 0.48 1.00  
(7) SEOPRC/TRDPRC    -0.04 -0.32 0.37 0.19 0.21 0.13 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
